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INTELLIGENCE IN NATO: A NEW PARADIGM

BY

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INTELLIGENCE IN NATO: A NEW PARADIGM

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ABSTRACT

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in 1949 with a clear military task of defense and deterence in a bipolar world. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the environment in which NATO now operates is very different. Though NATO has made many adaptations in response to this changing environment, the intelligence system and process have not changed. Though NATO's mission has changed dramatically and technology has caused a revolution in military affairs, the provision of intelligence remains a national prerogative, as it was 50 years ago. A new paradigm is proposed for providing truly multinational intelligence to NATO. If NATO is to be an effective military organization, it must be able to collect, analyze and report intelligence apart from national requirements.

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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO NATO: A NEW PARADIGM

Change has characterized the geopolitical world since the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, which symbolized the demise of European communism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), established in 1949, has undergone significant changes in response to the dissolution of European communism and subsequent geopolitical changes. NATO's historic mission, which was formulated in the post World War II bipolar world, is no longer applicable given the changes of the last decade. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of Soviet military power, the imminent threat of a conventional attack of the scale and breadth that the Alliance faced for its first forty years vanished. NATO no longer faces a clearly defined threat in the form of a monolithic, stable and predictable enemy. Today NATO faces a world of great instability. Domestic disintegration threatens a number of sovereign states and there is an increasing demand for international intervention in humanitarian emergencies and human violations. Because of its military capabilities, it is not uncommon for NATO to be called upon by organizations such as the United Nations (UN) to intervene in European situations.

The role of intelligence in these military operations and military operations other than war (MOOTW) has also changed significantly. Gone are the days of an easily recognizable enemy with identifiable doctrine, tactics and weapon systems.³ Today NATO faces a myriad of combatants in a variety of locations using indigenous tactics.⁴ The belligerents' intentions, actions and tactics are unpredictable thus timely and accurate intelligence is required, more so than in the former bipolar world. However, it often appears that intelligence is an afterthought in these operations. It is questionable as to whether NATO has the intelligence necessary to support these new operations or the means to disseminate it to those who can react to it. Additionally, a number of different operations may be conducted simultaneously, with each operation requiring different intelligence support.

NATO has no organic intelligence capabilities to provide the requisite intelligence to successfully accomplish the assigned missions and is dependent on the Alliance's member nations for intelligence. Since establishment of the Alliance, provision of intelligence to NATO has been a national responsibility. A fact of NATO life was that its nations judged their most important national intelligence to be too sensitive to be put into NATO.⁵ Though NATO has responded to many of the changes in the geopolitical sphere, provision of intelligence to the Alliance is one aspect that has gone unchanged.

In addition to the changes in the geopolitical sphere, the world has also witnessed a revolutionary change in the handling and dissemination of information. Technological advances allow for the timely manipulation and dissemination of information. A number of analysts have concluded that the world is now experiencing an Information Revolution, which represents a new and significant era for the world. As a result of this technological revolution, a new mode of warfare, Information Warfare, has arisen. However, existing evidence suggests that NATO has failed to take full advantage of the current technological advances and as a result, its military capabilities do not realize their full potential.

Additionally, NATO is not organizationally structured and poised to take advantage of these technological advances and become a key player in the Information Revolution. As a consequence, potential antagonists facing the Alliance may have a significant advantage in this arena.

THE ORIGINS OF NATO

Economically and politically devastated by World War II, Europe was also facing the threat of communism in the post-war period. The internal problems were aggravated by feelings of insecurity stemming in part from the internal challenges to democratic institutions posed by communists and other extremists. By 1948, Europe was facing a militarily superior Soviet Union which seemingly had adopted a policy of opposition toward the Western powers. This opposition included obstructionism in international organizations and conferences and support for guerilla operations in a number of places. This opposition culminated in the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948, denying Western allies ground access to their troops there and blocking the flow of supplies to the Berlin public.

A number of political moves were made in the 1947-48 period in an attempt to counter the threat from the Soviet Union –these included the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the Brussels Treaty. The European nations realized that these efforts would not sufficiently deter the threat of Soviet aggression and as a result, 10 European countries as well as Canada and the U.S. signed the North Atlantic Treaty (also known as the Washington Treaty) in April 1949. The Treaty established a military alliance in which an armed attack against one or more of the signatories would be considered an attack against all the treaty's parties. Most importantly, it brought the U.S. onto the European scene as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union.

What is important is that NATO is not a supranational organization, but a multinational one. As the NATO Handbook phrases it, "It is an intergovernmental organization in which member countries retain their sovereignty and independence". The success of NATO is totally dependent on the interactions amongst the national delegations and on the ability of the national delegations to reconcile their national interests in furtherance of NATO objectives. As a multinational, intergovernmental association of free and independent states, NATO has no supranational authority or policy-making function independent of its members. NATO is more of a community than just a military alliance. This approach is critical to intelligence support since agreement is mandatory among the members before a threat is officially recognized. Additionally, all the member nations must agree to any changes in the intelligence policy and process before the Alliance adopts them.

NATO'S TRANSFORMATION

NATO has been characterized by a degree of flexibility in the recent era of rapid change. The threat of a major war has been replaced by threats to security arising from political instability and ethnic conflicts. In response to this new and changing threat, NATO has undergone a process of far-reaching

adaptation. The Alliance's core mission remains collective defense, but its organization, military capability and structures have been changed to enable it to address new tasks, in particular those involving cooperation with non-member countries and crisis management. Prior to 1989, NATO had a single military mission, however the environment has changed. Deterence of, and defense against aggression is still a goal; however, crisis management, the use of troops to back up political moves is probably the most important and certainly the most urgent task of the Alliance. 12

Key NATO innovations undertaken since 1989 include the adoption of a new Strategic Concept; enlargement of the Alliance; development of increased coordination and cooperation with other international institutions; and agreement to make NATO's assets and experience available to support international peacekeeping operations. Additionally the military structure is being revamped to better meet the new demands. Another of the changes is NATO's growing use of multinational formations (MNF). Such formations play an important role in the Alliance, promoting cohesion, reinforcing links, and demonstrating Alliance solidarity. 14

In addition to internal changes, NATO has undertaken a number of initiatives to develop relationships with other organizations allowing the Alliance and its members to play a greater role in European security affairs. The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) enables European members of the Alliance to take greater responsibility for their common security and defense while reinforcing the transatlantic link. ¹⁵

A key aspect of the NATO reorganization and its role in European security is the agreement to establish a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). The intent of the CJTF initiative is to revamp NATO's military structure in order to keep it relevant in a new era wherein a ready capability for crisis response would be in greater demand than the need for territorial defense. ¹⁶ The CJTF is designed to respond to the military demands that may threaten the collective interests of NATO's members. The Alliance can guarantee the security of Western Europe, possessing the network of bases, communications equipment and armed forces necessary for this task. What is unique about NATO's CJTF is that it will permanently institutionalize the multinational task force concept and it will give the allies an always-ready capability for peacekeeping enforcement and other operations called for under the Alliance's new Strategic Concept. ¹⁷

Additionally, the concept allows for NATO to execute WEU-led military operations with the WEU having politico-military leadership. The operations would be executed by forces and staffs from the NATO military structure under the command of the CJTF HQ. NATO's North Atlantic Council, the senior political decision-making body within the Alliance, would approve operations in support of the WEU.

To support WEU-led operations, it was confirmed at the April 1999, Washington Summit that arrangements had been established for the effective sharing of information, including intelligence, that NATO and the WEU would require. The U.S. has expressed its willingness to support European-led operations by making intelligence available to NATO as well as other support such as transportation and logistics.

The ESDI and the growing relationship with the WEU give NATO access to another intelligence source, the WEU Torrejon Satellite Center which exploits imagery from various satellites. The Center provides imagery and analyst comments in response to information requests. The WEU is obviously the primary customer, however NATO may also receive information developed by the Center. As the relationship between NATO and the WEU develops, the Center will provide both organizations the ability to assess areas of interest to both and to carry out assessments in conjunction with other NATO and WEU intelligence assets. Exchange of data base information on targets of common interest will aid in developing the synergy between the two organizations. Currently, access to imagery is limited and until the WEU has its own capability, availability of imagery will be a problem.

The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was introduced by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen in November 1998 and was adopted by NATO in April 1999. The initiative calls for a more flexible and mobile force to meet conflict resulting from such outbreaks as ethnic or religious tensions. In his description, Secretary Cohen described four core capabilities; mobility, effective engagement, survivability and sustainability. He referred to three enablers required to achieve the core capabilities; responsive information collection, processing and dissemination, interoperability and joint Alliance exploitation of technological innovations. The Initiative addresses the issue of burden sharing within the Alliance and it can be argued that to reach the stated objectives, it will mean an increase in spending by the European Alliance members on high technology.

One option that would eliminate the debate over burden sharing is to make the Alliance responsible for information collection, processing and dissemination. Instead of the individual member nations wrestling with the choices in defense spending, the Alliance can take on these responsibilities. In addition to resolving the burden sharing issue, such an approach would also resolve the interoperability issue to some degree. The Alliance would have to develop interoperable systems to disseminate information to the national entities, but collection and processing would be internal to the Alliance structure and would not require interoperability with national systems.

In order to support the new military structure and the new initiatives, an intelligence architecture must be created that is robust, flexible and governed as much as possible by the principles of interoperability and commonality. The existing intelligence structure, policies and processes were established in a period of territorial defense in a bipolar world. The environment has changed dramatically and the Alliance has adopted a number of initiatives in response to the new environment. Though the Alliance's military structure has undergone change, the intelligence structure has not kept pace with the changes adapted by the Alliance.

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

The field of intelligence has also experienced a change, being influenced by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). At one time, intelligence was a singular art with particular associations with international relations, defense, and national security and was governed by security and associated with

specialized institutions. That concept has changed and intelligence is no longer considered a singular art, but intelligence is now expected to provide a total picture.

Intelligence can no longer include all aspects of information or data collected against enemy forces. It is time to recognize the distinction between information and intelligence and construct the appropriate mechanisms to disseminate the information to those for whom it holds the most value. New times need new approaches. Intelligence can be considered the overarching term and a subset of the overarching intelligence concept is information. Information would include surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance data on low-level organizations, such as tactical formations. For the most part it would come from assets under the operational control of the tactical commander but it can also be collected by national and theater assets. The key factor is that the information meets immediate operational needs, with the emphasis on immediate. Informational data can feed the intelligence process, but not necessarily. Information should be considered as providing data directly and immediately to the war fighter for "threat detection, warning, avoidance, target acquisition and homing.²⁰ Information provides the operational war fighter accurate, real-time or near real-time situational awareness.

Generally, information, unlike intelligence, does not require human processing or judgement. Technology, in the form of computers and communications systems, permits an almost instantaneous delivery of information to customers in a useable form. Today, over 99 per cent of this operational data is available at the SECRET level for direct use by the war fighter. Situational awareness of the battlefield does not require a high degree of protection however, given the laws of human nature, people will try to hide information when they believe it is to their advantage. To be useful in a combat situation, information must be provided to the war fighter at a classification level that he can use, generally at the SECRET level or below. When data are highly classified, what is being protected is not necessarily the data itself, but the sources and methods used to collect and process the data and possibly the method used to disseminate it in a timely manner. Given that situational data are available from unencrypted communications, scouting parties or radars onboard platforms, there is not much to protect in the way of sources and methods. Information does allow the commander to see the battlefield, allowing him to locate, identify and track enemy military equipment and units. Information allows the commander to draw inferences, however without intelligence he is unable to accurately assess the enemy's intentions.

Intelligence goes beyond situational awareness. Intelligence incorporates analysis, interpretation and collation with related information and background to meet the specific needs of the user. Because of the need for processing and human manipulation and judgement, intelligence is often not as timely as information. Additionally, intelligence may come from collection assets which are often not controlled by the operational commander or may incorporate the data previously identified as information and provided for situational awareness. However, the added value is the assessment of the purpose behind the movement and the ability to forecast what the war fighter may have to face in the future. Intelligence is evolved with a unique role as the authority on the enemy, understanding him in depth, as the expert assessor the forecaster. Intelligence can be considered as the answer to the mysteries involved in the

world of military affairs. It contributes to an understanding of facts, patterns and trends but, the answers may or may not be discoverable. And this is a key point which must be clearly understood by the commander. Intelligence is not a precise science, but an art and therefore may not be able to answer all of the commander's questions. Intelligence deals in the world of probabilities, whereas information deals in the world of certainty. Intelligence provides a more complete, in-depth understanding of the enemy. It has the potential for providing insights which are unavailable to the war fighter looking solely at information. Intelligence is often characterized by fragile, covert sources susceptible to counter measures and hence needing the protection of secrecy. In some cases, it may only be available from sources that are tightly protected by the enemy.

Though the above arguments may be accepted by U.S. and U.K. intelligence agencies, not all members of NATO may accept them. Two of the major intelligence suppliers must convince the other members of the Alliance of the distinction between information and intelligence, the protection that should be applied to both and the significance of information to the war fighter. The enemy, whether it be a monolithic, static entity or characteristic of the enemies facing NATO today, is aware that the Alliance members have the assets necessary to collect information along the line of engagement and into the enemy's territory. Attempts by the Alliance to safeguard this information at the expense of denying it to war fighters is counterproductive. If one accepts this, then information should be provided to the war fighter at the SECRET level and protected differently from intelligence. However, there are fragile sources and methods and processes that need protection. The war fighter needs to realize that not all data will be provided at the SECRET level and there are some data, intelligence, that will be provided through Alliance security channels or through national channels.

INTELLIGENCE WITHIN NATO

NATO's integrated command structure is supported by multinational intelligence staffs. There is no intelligence system in the sense of an independent, freestanding organization that operates its own assets in support of Alliance needs.²⁵ It is very rare when the NATO staffs develop a truly command intelligence picture because the existent Alliance intelligence organization controls no collection assets and the staffs are totally dependent on national inputs which may or may not be responsive to the commander's requirements.

Since the establishment of NATO over five decades ago, the provision of intelligence has been a national prerogative. The concept was established in the early years of NATO's existence and the exact reasons behind this policy are unknown. This policy has been reinforced over the years and is part of NATO's Intelligence Policy.

NATO intelligence collection has been and remains a function of individual national intelligence capabilities and products. ²⁶ In a bipolar world, absent any active military conflict, this approach was acceptable. Nations would provide the Alliance their perspective and views on the threat in order to develop the common Alliance threat which would lead to development of the subsequent strategy.

Though there were a number of possibilities, the fact is that NATO never engaged the Warsaw Pact in hostilities during the 50 years the Alliance has been in existence and thus, the intelligence system was never truly battle tested. Though there are multinational intelligence staffs, there was no true Alliance appraisal or assessment of a situation, only national assessments as massaged by the NATO intelligence staffs. The nations "promised" the Alliance that if hostilities with the Warsaw Pact were to break out then the national, highly classified intelligence would be provided. Again, in a threatening, but nonhostile world, this approach worked.

In the bipolar world, the principal role of intelligence within NATO was to provide warning and an assessment of the threat against the Alliance. That environment has changed significantly, and as pointed out above, the mission of NATO has changed dramatically since the demise of European communism. The world against which NATO is now arrayed is one of significant change. Because of the rapidly changing and dynamic environment, timely information and intelligence about the environment is a top priority for the Alliance. In the current environment, intelligence staffs are expected to evaluate the intelligence passed to them by the nations and brief the appropriate civil and military decision makers in a timely fashion. The timeliness of the decision briefings is dependent on the nations and how quickly they can provide the necessary intelligence.

The national analysis provided to NATO might be flawed in that it is inflexible and characterized by arrogance and persistence in beliefs that are not working. ²⁸ If the analysis is characterized as such, the lack of conflicting information and true intelligence experts deny the NATO commander a true NATO assessment. Also, the composition of the Alliance may lead to disagreements which may influence and color assessments, both on the national inputs and within the multinational staffs. The striving for consensus, which is the basis for the Alliance, may discourage staffs from taking a hard and critical look at alternative explanations. If there is uncertainty about the interpretation of information, the staffs may be prone to resolve the uncertainty by favoring the data which support their personal or national views.

When NATO was established to oppose the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, national and Alliance interests coincided. However, with the changing Alliance mission, national and Alliance interests and thus intelligence needs may not coincide. Not all the member nations may agree with the direction of the Alliance and its intelligence needs. Additionally, some member nations may have close ties with Alliance adversaries and therefore would be reluctant to conduct intelligence collection activities against them. Experiences in Bosnia have indicated that although there is a vast array of intelligence assets and personnel deployed within the theater, national agendas dictate collection priorities resulting in a paucity of information for IFOR.²⁹

A new structure and process need to be created that would enhance the ability to address the challenges of a different, emerging, global military environment. The new structure must be able to support the Alliance as it becomes involved in the new and changing world. NATO needs a more disciplined intelligence system. What needs to undergo a dramatic change is the mindset or culture of the member nations whereby they must realize that, in many instances, the Alliance's interests are more

important than national interests. The member nations and the individuals filling NATO posts need to grasp and accept this concept for a truly multinational perspective to occur. As stated earlier, NATO is a community, not just a military alliance.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

A review of intelligence operations in support of Operation Joint Endeavor can illustrate some of the types of problems that may occur in future operations of the same type. The following discussion incorporates some of the problem areas as highlighted by participants.

The different national personnel assignment policies and the NATO decision to conduct split operations between Naples and Bosnia led to a number of problems. Often personnel arrived at the headquarters with minimal experience in the Balkans and hence, very limited knowledge of the area. In some cases, personnel had no significant analytic experience or no experience in analysis of the complex environment they were facing. The rapid changeover of personnel resulted in the staff constantly being in a state of flux thus preventing the development of regular working relationships. Additionally, the personnel were not familiar with procedures and processes for requesting information from national intelligence assets, identification of priorities and were not in a position to determine if progress was being made. Additionally, there was an extreme concern with force protection and the focus of the collection and analytical effort was on threats to the force to the exclusion of understanding situations.³¹

Probably the biggest issue facing the Alliance and the nations was that of releasability of information. For a variety of reasons, the nations are selective in what intelligence they release to NATO. As a result, the Alliance does not benefit from all the national intelligence collection assets because of the potential conflict between national and Alliance requirements. The result is that the Alliance operates with incomplete information.

Though it is a NATO operation, about 12 of the nations provided national intelligence cells to support their own commanders and forces and each cell had its own national rules and procedures for sharing intelligence with NATO. This allowed national commanders a significant degree of independence. Additionally, national intelligence planning was not shared with NATO and the command was not aware of what capabilities would be available to support its intelligence requirements.

The problems that plagued the NATO intelligence system over the decades were highlighted during Operation Joint Endeavor. The problems emphasized the need to change the NATO intelligence system given the changing environment and the new missions that NATO will be facing in the future.

A NEW PARADIGM

Depending on the nations for intelligence support is no longer acceptable. The national inputs can supplement a NATO capability, but can no longer be the sole intelligence source. In order to be effective, NATO, as a military command, must have a professional intelligence staff and a collection capability that would respond to a NATO commander's requirements in a timely manner. If NATO is expected to react

effectively and in a timely manner, it must have the capability to collect and disseminate the information necessary to support operations.

Manning of the NATO intelligence staffs is the first item that must be addressed. There are no common criteria used by the Alliance's member nations to fill national posts within the Alliance. The NATO intelligence staff is reportedly seriously undermanned and untrained and in many cases, the personnel are not trained to evaluate the latest types of information they may be expected to receive. As one senior British officer has remarked, "Intelligence staffs would have to deal with intelligence abounding in quality and quantity with which they were completely unfamiliar". A Some nations fill intelligence-related positions with professional intelligence personnel but others fill intelligence positions with non-intelligence personnel resulting in a detrimental effect on the NATO intelligence process. Some nations consider a NATO assignment as part of military career development and such an assignment is mandatory, which is not the case in other nations. Success in the type of operations NATO must undertake is highly dependent on the abilities of the intelligence staffs. These staffs must bring together both process and product. The practice of assigning unqualified personnel and the differing national rotational procedures preclude the development of regular working relationships and a true understanding of the intelligence problem and process.

In many cases, member nations' personnel will augment the core staffs in times of crisis in order to carry out the intelligence mission.³⁶ This could result in disruption of staff integrity at a critical moment and it will take time for the staff to once again function and operate effectively. Transforming what is essentially a small peacetime operation into one that can respond in an effective and timely manner in a crisis situation is a difficult task. One also has to question if the nations will provide their best analysts during a crisis. The Bosnian experience has shown that some countries took special pains to send well-qualified officers to the NATO headquarters, whereas the practice of other nations, such as the U.S., was nonchalant at best.³⁷ NATO cannot function effectively with a part-time staff during a crisis. Operation Joint Endeavor has shown that NATO must be able to do it on its own in the future without augmentation.³⁸

The U.S. provides a large volume of intelligence to the alliance, but unfortunately the U.S. does not have an effective personnel assignment policy regarding postings to the Alliance. The lack of a policy has a negative impact on the alliance intelligence process and raises a question, is the U.S.-provided intelligence being exploited to its fullest? The U.S., policy regarding personnel assignments to NATO must undergo a dramatic change. Assignments are generally done by the individual services and personal career concerns and vested service interests generally guide the assignment of personnel. The U.S. has to develop a cadre of officers for international commands who come under the guidance of and are championed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Assignment of personnel to international assignments is a national matter and not the matter of the individual services. The JCS should intervene with the individual services to ensure that career progression is guaranteed and that individuals are not penalized for being part of a cadre of international officers. The NATO intelligence process would be much more

effective if individuals came to NATO with a good working knowledge of how the supported command's intelligence process worked.

Such an approach would ensure there is a core of at least U.S. intelligence officers and noncommissioned officers within the Alliance. These professionals would rotate between the various NATO intelligence staffs. Having a cadre of U.S. intelligence professionals would ensure that the intelligence provided to the Alliance by the U.S. is used to its maximum effectiveness. It would also allow the U.S. to lobby the other Alliance members to take a similar approach and ensure that NATO has a cadre of multinational intelligence professionals. An effective intelligence organization must be manned by professionals and the U.S. must take the lead to ensure that the NATO intelligence organization is manned by professional intelligence personnel.

A cadre of intelligence professionals within the Alliance would contribute to the integration of operations and intelligence within the Alliance. The intelligence staff must understand both friendly and enemy operations. Effective interface between the two elements can occur if the intelligence analysts are aware of the current friendly situation and can rapidly report significant enemy actions in response to friendly actions. In order to link intelligence requirements with the concept of operation, the intelligence staff must understand the commander's intent and tasks. A permanent cadre of intelligence professionals would enhance the intelligence/operations interface within NATO.

A key element of the new paradigm (and perhaps the most controversial) is NATO's acquisition of an intelligence collection capability. For the reasons cited above, NATO can no longer be at the mercy of national collection strategies and capabilities, but must have its own capability to collect intelligence in a quickly evolving and dynamic environment to support operations. Giving NATO such a capability would eliminate national concerns about compromising the security of their national secrets.³⁹

Admittedly, the establishment of such a capability would not come without cost and controversy. Though the national intelligence communities may be supportive of such an initiative, national interests may result in the initiative not being funded. If the funding issue can be resolved, the Alliance decision-makers have to prioritize their needs. The importance of weapons platforms, communications systems and similar equipment will have to be weighed against an intelligence collection capability. The type and number of collection platforms to be procured is also a decision to be made by the supported commands and not by the member nations. If a collection capability is procured, the NATO intelligence staffs will have to be increased in size to incorporate the requisite collection managers.

The idea of NATO possessing its own assets raises the specter of building and maintaining technical databases. To date, the attitude of the member nations has been to withhold technical information from NATO since the Alliance does not have a collection asset to manage and support. However, if NATO has its own collection capability, the Alliance will need to build and maintain its own technical databases to support its collection capability. If the appropriate personnel are assigned to the NATO intelligence organization, then building and maintenance of databases can be a reality. NATO may

have to establish a special organization and channels to handle the technical information. Additionally, those nations that possess technical data should be encouraged to share their information with NATO.

NATO is not a stay-at-home or an in-garrison military force. NATO military formations deploy under a NATO commander to carry out military and peace operations. Suitable intelligence structures must be devised that can be set up virtually anywhere on fairly short notice. 40 While the merits of MNF are appealing, such formations are not without problems. The difficulties inherent in interoperability are exacerbated in multi-national formations (MNF). The differences in language, doctrine, training and structure only complicate the use of MNF. Additionally, there is a difference in capabilities. Whereas one national formation may have substantial intelligence assets and access to national capabilities, another national formation on its flank may not have the same capabilities. Such differences only make the task of the NATO commander more difficult as subordinate units have different information. The NATO commander may have information he cannot share with subordinate formations because he received it via national channels vice multinational channels. Additionally, even if he wanted to share the information, a process for sharing may not exist. The sharing, or more appropriately, the inability to share what may be critical information could have an adverse impact on operations. Access to relevant intelligence is more urgent to the multinational formations operating together at lower levels. 41 NATO's new strategy relies on timely warning to allow NATO's forces to mobilize, train and deploy to fulfill their missions. MNF need to be able to receive and assess the entire range of intelligence in a timely manner.

A new structure to support deployed multinational formations must be developed. Intelligence resources, collection management linkages, analysis, and linkages to both international and national databases, etc must be concentrated in a single unit that can deploy with the NATO formation(s) committed to an operation. Intelligence capabilities are scarce resources that should be concentrated in a single unit subordinate to the supported commander. Such an intelligence unit can respond immediately to any requirement from a commander.

Such a unit would be controlled at the highest level, e.g. SHAPE or SACLANT. When not deployed, these units will be located at these commands and would augment the intelligence staffs at these two headquarters, thus maintaining their skills, keeping current on potential trouble spots and staying aware of what data are available at the higher headquarters.

Additional units or staffs should be established at various command levels. Queries from the deployed units would be forwarded through the intelligence chain of command. The final and authoritative intelligence databases would be located at both SHAPE and SACLANT. The SHAPE/SACLANT cells would also have connectivity to the national intelligence focal points, so if there was a question the NATO organization could not answer, it could be directed to the nations. In this way, national intelligence information could supplement NATO intelligence and nations would remain in the NATO intelligence cycle.

Some analysts have predicted that that domination of the information sphere will determine the victor in the next battle. At least one analyst has called for the establishment of an information corps that

would incorporate the tasks of information collection and dissemination. ⁴² He predicts that future warfare will see an integration of information and weapons system. The corps would be responsible for developing the doctrine and the battle plan for information operations and for implementing both. The establishment of an intelligence unit would allow NATO to posture itself for the Information Revolution. The intelligence unit would form the basis for the future formation of Information Corps or units to carry out information warfare. Such a capability would make NATO a viable combatant on the information battlefield.

TECHNOLOGY

Generally, the NATO communications community is not supportive of dedicated communications but supports common user communications systems. A communications/dissemination system must accompany the establishment of a new Alliance intelligence structure. As the intelligence system proves its value, more will be demanded of it. As the volume of intelligence increases, it will become crucial to disseminate it in a timely manner to the appropriate customers via an unimpeded information flow. If dissemination cannot be accomplished, it will call into question the value of a viable intelligence system. Additionally, elements of the intelligence organization must be able to communicate with each other in a timely fashion.

The best communications system to support intelligence operations is a dedicated, secure, deployable system, based on a SATCOM encrypted link. The system should provide sufficient bandwidth to provide a capability for all modes of communication, voice, fax and data links. Such systems are available and are relatively inexpensive. 43

Many analysts discuss the technological revolution in conceptual terms. However, at least one capability resulting from the technological revolution has been tested with some degree of success. Admittedly a number of issues need to be resolved, but it represents a first step toward using existing technology to support the Alliance. During the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration 1999, an U.S. supplied multilayer, multinational network was provided. It connected some of the Alliance nations as well as SHAPE. The participants derived insight into the benefits of sharing the theater of operations information in a virtual environment. Though the participants were unable to exchange all battlefield information, it represents a major first step, providing connection between the nations and a NATO Headquarters. It exemplifies the fact that the technology revolution is more than a concept, it is reality. It is this kind of development that must be built upon to ensure an exchange capability within the Alliance.

Another possibility is the use of the Internet for Alliance intelligence communications. By using encryption devices to ensure the security of the information, the Alliance's intelligence organization could exchange information over the Internet. It would require all subscribers to use the same encryption settings on their devices. It is readily available and a relatively inexpensive communications mode. One negative is that the Internet is subject to exploitation by adversaries. It is the least preferable mode of communication, but could be used as an interim or a backup capability.

CONCLUSION

The new paradigm outlined above is controversial, but necessary. As NATO undertakes new missions in the evolving post-Cold War era, it is imperative that it be supported by a true intelligence structure and not the amalgamation of intelligence released by the nations to the various parts of the Alliance. The Alliance can no longer be held hostage by the nations when it comes to intelligence support. At present, NATO intelligence is a contradiction of terms and NATO intelligence in the classical sense does not exist. Intelligence has to move from national control to truly NATO control if it is to be effective in supporting the NATO military structure and to ensure that the Alliance remains inside the decision cycle of potential adversaries. NATO is facing a new era and new problems, and new problems require new solutions. New intelligence policies, structures and processes are needed to raise the effectiveness of intelligence within the Alliance. The former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Gen. Shalikashvili called for a reorganization of NATO's intelligence gathering capabilities to support the new types of conflicts the Alliance faces in the post-Cold War.⁴⁵

It is not advocated that the paradigm outlined above be completely instituted at one time. The paradigm is seen as incremental and evolutionary. The structure that is originally established should have a built-in capability to grow and change as necessary. The existing NATO intelligence staffs must undertake an aggressive program of attempting to convince the member nations that a new approach to intelligence must be undertaken within the Alliance. As a leader within the Alliance and one of the largest contributors of intelligence, the U.S. must also take a leadership role in bringing about the new paradigm. Though it may be time consuming and frustrating, such an approach must be undertaken to ensure that intelligence is effective and a force multiplier in future NATO operations.

Word Count: 7676

ENDNOTE

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- ³ Michael L. Warsocki, "Intelligence Within Operational Art," <u>Military Review</u> 2 (March-April, 1996): 44.
 - ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ Michael Herman, <u>Intelligence Power in Peace and War</u> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 364.
- ⁶ Joseph I. Coffey, <u>The Future Role of NATO</u> (Ephrata, Pennsylvania: Foreign Policy Association, 1997), 5.
 - ⁷ Ibid., 6.
- ⁸ "The North Atlantic Treaty" linked from the <u>Army War College</u>, available from http://www.nato.int/dpci/basictxt/treaty.html; Internet; accessed 29 November 1999.
 - ⁹ Coffey, 17.
- ¹⁰ "NATO Basic Fact Sheet Nr 12, "linked from the <u>Army War College</u>, available from http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/what.html; Internet; accessed 29 November 1999.
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 - ¹² Coffey, 56.
 - ¹³ NATO Basic Fact Sheet Nr. 12.
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- ¹⁵ "NATO Basic Fact Sheet,"; available from < http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/dev-esdi.htm: Internet; accessed 27 January 2000.
- ¹⁶ Charles L. Barry, "The NATO CJTF Command and Control Concept," in <u>Command in NATO After the Cold War: Alliance, National and Multinational Considerations</u>. Ed. Thomas Durell-Young (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College 1997), 29.
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- ²⁰ Michael Herman, "Where Hath Our Intelligence Been? The Revolution in Military Affairs," <u>Royal United Service Institute (RUSI)</u> for <u>Defense Studies Journal</u> 143 (December 1998): 62.
 - ²¹ Ibid., 64.
- ²² John D. Stempel, "Error, Folly, and Policy Intelligence," <u>International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence</u> 12 (Fall 1999): 267.
 - ²³ Herman, <u>RUSI Journal</u>, 62.
 - ²⁴ Ibid., 63.
- ²⁵ Paul B. Stares, <u>Command Performance: The Neglected Dimension of European Security</u> (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institutitution 1991), 87.
 - ²⁶ James Williams, "Intelligence Support to NATO," <u>Signal</u> 38 (December 1983): 89.
 - ²⁷ Stares, 90.
 - ²⁸ Stempel, 272.
- ²⁹ George K. Gramer, "Operation Joint Endeavor: Lessons from Bosnia," December 1998; available from http://huachuca.usaic.army.mil/contlearning/infrastructure/media/mipb/octde.../gramer.htm; accessed 27 January 2000.
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 - ³⁷ Gentry.
 - ³⁸ Gramer.

- ³⁹ John Hughes-Wilson, "Battlefield Intelligence for the Future," <u>NATO's Sixteen Nations</u> 36 (December 1991): 41.
- ⁴⁰ David M. Keithley, "Leading Intelligence in the 21st Century: Past As Prologue," <u>American Intelligence Journal</u> 19 (Spring 1999): 63.
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- ⁴² Martin C. Libicki, "Towards an Information Corps," in <u>The Mesh and the Net: Speculations in Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon</u> (Washington D.C.: National Defense university, 1995): 67.
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- ⁴⁴ "Allied Force Technology Demonstrations Illustrate Power of Coalition Network," <u>Signal</u> 54 (October 1999): 37.
 - ⁴⁵ "Washington Outlook," <u>Aviation Week & Space Technology</u> 138 (January 18, 1993): 19.

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